ABSTRACT: This paper aims to clarify debate over the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity, by investigating whether different philosophers' claims are about the same subject or (as argued by Derek Parfit) they are using the terms 'normative' and 'normativity' with different meanings. While I suggest the term may be multiply ambiguous, I also find reasons for optimism about a common subject-matter for metanormative theory. This is supported by sketching a special hybrid view of normative judgment, perspectivism, that occupies a position between cognitivism and noncognitivism, naturalism and nonnaturalism, objectivism and subjectivism. I explore three main fissures: between (i) the "normativity" of language/thought versus that of facts and properties, (ii) abstract versus substantive, and (iii) formal versus robust normativity.
In recent jargon, metanormative theory explores fundamental questions crosscutting ethics, political and legal philosophy, aesthetics, epistemology, and more. It is described as the study of normativity, suggesting there is something, called 'normativity', that is the common object of the competing theories of the philosophers working in this field. The literature on "normativity" has in a short time become overwhelmingly huge.
12 So a curious layperson might reasonably ask, "So, what is this "normativity", then?" This innocent little question might already be interrogation enough to make philosophers squirm and sweat, because it is hard to find any definition that every metanormative theorist can agree on, as we'll see. At least one leading practitioner, Derek Parfit, has recently gone so far as to claim that many philosophers who appear to disagree with him about the nature of normativity must be using their terms with different meanings, and talking about something else entirely. 3 One may reasonably be skeptical, as I previously was. Dismissing opponents' claims as not even about the same subject seems to foreclose on the possibility of substantive theoretical disagreement prematurely. This paper finds, in partial agreement with Parfit, that philosophical discussion about "normativity" is plagued by systematic ambiguities contributing to significant confusion, as there are many things that "normativity" can
Preliminaries
First I need to explain and defend my basic assumptions. This paper addresses two words: the noun 'normativity' and the adjective 'normative'. Since 'normativity' is just the nowadays-preferred nominalization of the adjective 'normative', 5 one might expect these to be interdefinable as follows: to describe something as 'normative' (in a particular sense) is to ascribe it a property that is denoted by 'normativity' (in a corresponding sense). We'll encounter some important exceptions to this rule, but I will shift between noun and adjective as suits the context.
I will argue that these words are multiply ambiguous, as used by metanormative theorists (subsequently, "theorists"). Readers might be skeptical that any systematic ambiguities would go unnoticed by so many trained philosophers. When we think about lexical ambiguity, we typically consider forms of simple homonymy: identically spelled and pronounced words with unrelated meanings, like 'hide' (animal skin vs. to conceal), or the standard example of 'bank' (financial institution vs. sloping landform). However, the ambiguities at issue here are cases rather of polysemy: identically spelled and pronounced words with distinct but closely related meanings, as classically illustrated by Aristotle's example of 'healthy' (as of food vs. as of organisms). Polysemies are often subtle and easily overlooked even by sophisticated thinkers, as well as being ubiquitous in natural language, 6 and therefore pose a much greater equivocation risk in philosophy. So denying that metanormative theory is unified by interest in a common object of inquiry called "normativity" does not imply, implausibly, that it is a Frankenstein's monster stitched together out of unrelated parts, akin to "Hideology", the (imaginary) study of concealment and animal skins. I suspect many theorists are aware 'normative' is polysemous, but that few realize how much this has confused metanormative debate.
In identifying different possible senses for 'normativity', I will be offering descriptive definitions. In particular, I will be seeking what I'll call theorists' effective definitions, which articulate the concepts that theorists are employing. Such a definition is reference-fixing for a theorist (or use-fixing, for words with nondescriptive functions) and therefore "nonnegotiable": to talk about something that doesn't satisfy the description is necessarily to change the subject. 7 Effective definitions must be sharply distinguished from theorists' official definitions, or what they explicitly offer as definitions, whether analytic or synthetic. This distinction is important because theorists' official definitions often constitute substantive theories of the nature of their objects, even when ostensibly offered as analytic or nonsubstantial. Official definitions are therefore "negotiable", and a theorist can in principle come to recognize hers as incorrect and needing revision. Ascribing effective definitions is a difficult and often presumptuous task: I will offer tentative hypotheses about what various theorists' concepts may be on the basis of their statements, but these must be weighed against the alternative possibility that those statements are merely mistaken.
The proposal to offer "definitions" may elicit concerns that some crucial questions are being begged from the outset. These concerns can be allayed, because I'll take a broad, ecumenical approach to the practice of definition. 8 One concern is on behalf of nonnaturalists like Parfit, who often claim that normativity is "indefinable", because primitive and sui generis. However, I allow that an adequate 6 As Fogal 2016 points out in rebuke of my 2014.
7 Following Joyce 2001: 3-4 . A definition's being nonnegotiable in this sense doesn't preclude the theorist from accepting a change of subject, even under the same terminology. Note that concepts in my sense are very different from David Copp's (2017) "ways of thinking", which are not reference-fixing and can misrepresent their objects. 8 A possible exception is the idea of reference-magnetism. I assume that it is something about the practice, mind, or situation of the speaker that determines what she is talking about, rather than the nature of the object itself.
definition of 'normativity' need only individuate the property in question (perhaps only privately), and needn't constitute an analysis of it. 9 For example, I take seriously ostensive definitions of the following kind: that property (mentally ostending something being cognized, perceived, remembered, or imagined). Definitions of this kind are both compatible with and familiar from the writings of nonnaturalists.
A second concern comes from semantic externalists, who may complain that for a term, like 'normativity', to successfully refer to something, there needn't be any description that every competent user of the term has in mind or associates with the word; i.e. that no description or concept has the status of being the word's conventional meaning. 'Normativity' might rather be the name of something. However, I don't assume that an adequate definition of 'normativity' must identify its conventional meaning, and I allow that different people might employ different, perhaps private, definitions or concepts for the same word. This might appear to make claims of ambiguity too cheap, but I'll also assume it is sufficient for univocity between two speakers that their different concepts contingently pick out the same reference; i.e. that sameness of meaning requires only that they are talking about the same thing. Finally, semantic externalists might also object that speakers might use a term like 'normativity' to refer without having any concept or description of the reference in mind at all; e.g. by virtue of their use standing in a causal chain with other uses. While skeptical, I allow for this too: an adequate definition, for a particular use of 'normativity', might simply be a description of the facts that fix the reference for that use, such as facts about the causal chain.
Univocity Between Cognitivists and Noncognitivists
The lack of any agreed-upon characterization of "normativity" might be thought simply an unsurprising consequence of metanormative theory's being an area of live debate, in which there are competing views about its nature. But researchers in disputed fields don't generally have any difficulty agreeing on some characterization of their common object of inquiry. Scientists disputing the chemical composition of water in the eighteenth century, for example, could agree at least that water is the stuff that flows in Earth's rivers, fills its oceans, and falls from the sky in the form of rain. If we are to find a common object for metanormative theorizing, it will presumably be through examining the common ground: what can all parties to the metanormative debate agree on?
The possible answers to this question are seriously constrained by the fact that the field includes significant numbers both of theorists who claim that "normativity" is a property of facts, properties, and relations (like ought-facts, goodness and rightness, and being-a-reason-for), and also of theorists who deny there are any "normative" facts, properties, and relations, but nonetheless don't generally deny that some kinds of things are "normative" or that there is "normativity". Prima facie it might seem that common ground can be found in applications to language and thought-as I have previously assumed. This includes linguistic and mental entities such as words, sentences, concepts, and beliefs, and acts such as utterances, assertions, claims, and judgments, but I'll write in conveniently fudgy terms of "expressions and judgments".
The Normativity of Language and Thought
Surely all theorists agree that some language and/or thought is normative? At least, I know of none who refuse to classify any expressions or judgments as 'normative'. But are they all predicating the same property with the term? This question might be thought to stir up needless trouble. Metanormative theorists are members of one contiguous linguistic community, thinking and writing in close engagement with each other, and largely assuming that they are all talking about the same thing. While there is considerable disagreement about the proper extension of the term (exactly which expressions and judgments are normative?), this arguably resembles either garden-variety vagueness or substantive disagreement over borderline cases, since there is also convergence on many central cases, like the words 'ought', 'wrong', and judgments about reasons to act. While I agree that these considerations lend a default presumption of univocity, this is undermined by closer scrutiny.
What does it mean to classify an expression or judgment as "normative"? Many theorists, who I'll call cognitivists, seem to favor an answer along the following, representationalist lines: an expression or judgment is "normative" just in case (or at least, only if) it is about something in the world of a special kind. What kind? The obvious answer is: of a "normative" kind. This answer is significant here for two reasons. First, it introduces us to an initial ambiguity (polysemy), just within cognitivists' use. Second, it casts doubt on the univocity of different theorists' talk about "normative" expressions or judgments.
This approach requires an ambiguity in 'normative', because whatever it is for something to be a "normative" fact or property, it can't be to be about something normative-or about anything at all, since facts (or states of affairs) and properties aren't in the business of being "about" things. Rather, it requires us to distinguish between ontological and representational senses of 'normative', as follows: 10 NORMATIVE ont : (As of facts and properties); Having a property P of some special kind.
NORMATIVE rep : (As of expressions and judgments); Being about something normative ont .
(To help readers, my definitions are collected together at the chapter's end.) These entries may need to be divided further into different ontological and representational senses, but for now let's suppose this is sufficiently fine-grained. 11 The relationship between NORMATIVE rep and NORMATIVE ont manifests a common pattern, or regular polysemy, which can also be observed, for example, in the adjectives 10 Cf. Eklund 2017: 64. Some theorists ("quietists") purport to recognize the existence of normative facts and properties without incurring any "ontological" commitments (e.g. Parfit 2011 , Scanlon 2014 , while disavowing "quasi-realism" (as defined in Blackburn 1993) . For discussion see Dreier 2016 , Streumer 2017 . Since I understand ontology simply as the study of what exists, I ignore this complication here. 11 Recognizing these senses is metaphysically noncommittal. Perhaps there is no property P, or nothing instantiates it; then nothing is normative ont . Or perhaps there are no normative rep expressions or judgments.
'mythological' and 'aesthetic'. Mythological 1 language (=language about mythology) needn't itself be mythological 2 (=existing only in cultural imagination); aesthetic 1 language (=language about aesthetic qualities) needn't itself be aesthetic 2 (=possess aesthetic qualities).
We can't stop with just these two senses of 'normative', because they apparently fail to accommodate the claims of noncognitivists, who acknowledge the existence of "normative" expressions and judgments, but deny that they are about "normative" facts and properties. This includes both nondescriptivists who deny that "normative" expressions and judgments are about or represent anything at all, and virtually all so-called hybrid theorists, who allow that "normative" expressions and judgments are representational, but attribute their status as "normative" not to their representing something normative ont , but to some other (noncognitive) function or property they have. As this makes clear, my distinction here between "cognitivism" and "noncognitivism" differs importantly from the usual distinction drawn in these terms. The issue here is not whether normative judgments have cognitive (representational, descriptive) content per se, but whether their status as normative is due to their cognitive content.
12
Noncognitivists are obviously committed to holding that there are no normative rep expressions or judgments, at least in our ordinary "normative" language and thought. So when noncognitivists classify an expression or judgment as "normative", they must mean something other than NORMATIVE rep . Indeed, while being normative rep would evidently entail being descriptive, many theorists use the words 'normative' and 'descriptive' as terms of direct contrast. Noncognitivists' talk about "normative" expressions and judgments seems to require a definition conforming to the following schema:
NORMATIVE funct : (As of expressions or judgments); Having the nonrepresentational function F.
There is a wide variety of noncognitivist theories about function F, although I presume they all construe it as a broadly psychological function. For example, it could be the function of expressing the speaker's motivational attitudes, or the function of motivating attitudes or behavior: "putting pressure on choice and action" (Blackburn 1993) . So this entry itself might need to be divided into distinct functional senses of 'normative', implying a failure of univocity even between different noncognitivists' talk about "normativity", although I'll ignore this complication here. Whatever F might be, however, its nonrepresentational character entails that whether an expression or judgment is normative funct is a completely different issue from whether it is normative rep .
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If I have correctly albeit roughly identified the effective definitions underlying cognitivists' and noncognitivists' talk about "normative" expressions and judgments, then it seems there is indeed no real common ground over whether there is normative language and thought, only a "verbal agreement" consisting in superficial overlap in application of an ambiguous vocabulary. If this was the best hope for finding common ground and thereby a common object for theories of "normativity", as we were supposing, then perhaps there is no common object at all. Since noncognitivists deny that "normative" language and thought derive their claim to "normativity" from representing special kinds of facts, they can be expected to deny that anything is normative ont . And since cognitivists deny that "normative" language and thought derive their "normativity" from a special nonrepresentational function they possess, they can be expected at least to deny that normativity funct is what their investigations are concerned with. So with respect to cognitivists' and noncognitivists' claims about "normativity", Parfit's radical pessimism might seem vindicated: they are just talking about completely different things.
It is too early to draw this conclusion, however, because we can dig deeper to try to locate an underlying univocity between cognitivists and noncognitivists. Even philosophers who explicitly endorse definitions along the lines of NORMATIVE rep or NORMATIVE funct might not be identifying their effective definitions, and their official definitions may turn out to represent competing, substantive, falsifiable theories of a common subject-matter.
Making Do
I'll now explore a solution that might initially seem promising but I think ultimately fails, before introducing a better solution in the next section. We might hope to find univocity by identifying the cognitivist's normativity ont with the noncognitivist's normativity funct . In principle, the extremely thin definitions above aren't incompatible: having some nonrepresentational function is a property of a special kind. So might cognitivists and noncognitivists be unified by common interest in a single functional property, normativity ont/funct ? Their differences would then consist in a substantive disagreement about this property: cognitivists maintain that it is a property of facts and properties, while noncognitivists maintain that it is exclusively a property of expressions and judgments.
For illustration, consider the familiar but vague identification of "normativity" with prescriptivity, glossed as the function of guiding agents or "telling them what to do". 14 A noncognitivist might claim that only expressions and/or judgments prescribe or tell agents what to do. A cognitivist might think that prescriptivity is "objective", and a function of some part of the "world itself", if of anything at all. 15 From noncognitivists' point of view, cognitivism is substantively mistaken because it attributes a property of expressions and judgments to facts and properties in the world-perhaps due to committing the "projective fallacy" of mistaking our subjective reactions to the world for objective qualities that prompt those reactions. 16 From cognitivists' point of view, noncognitivism is substantively mistaken because it attributes a property of facts and properties to certain of our expressions and judgments, which are instead about things with that property-perhaps due to committing the "psychologistic fallacy" of analyzing something objective in terms of our subjective reactions to it.
Could metanormative theory consist in substantive disagreements over a common object such as normativity ont/funct ? One problem comes, ironically, from what we began by supposing the best hope for common ground: that certain expressions and judgments are "normative". For cognitivists cannot mean to say that these expressions and judgments are normative ont/funct . They certainly may hold that 8 language or thought is normative ont , which is plausibly what is at issue in the debates over the "normativity of meaning" in the philosophy of language (e.g. whether a word's having a particular meaning has entailments about how it ought to be used), and over the normativity of intentional attitudes in the philosophy of mind (e.g. whether a particular kind of mental state constitutively involves being rationally required to behave in some way 17 ). But this could not be what cognitivists mean in classifying certain expressions (like 'ought') and judgments as "normative". First, cognitivism as such is neutral on the debates over the normativity of meaning and attitudes, and so clearly isn't committed to holding that expressions or judgments in general are normative ont . Yet no cognitivist denies there are any "normative" expressions or judgments. Second, cognitivists' classification of certain expressions or judgments as "normative" or "nonnormative" makes no sense on the supposition that they mean NORMATIVE ont/funct , because there is no good reason to think that only (e.g.) words that by the cognitivists' lights are about normativity ont , like 'ought', 'wrong', etc., and not others like 'tall' or 'blue', are themselves normative ont . This is not a plausible alternative to NORMATIVE rep as an interpretation of cognitivists' claims.
This approach fails to find univocity in cognitivists' and noncognitivists' talk of "normative" expressions and judgments, but you might think this needn't be a serious problem. From cognitivists' point of view, the most important sense of "normativity" is normativity ont . From noncognitivists' point of view, the important sense is normativity funct . If in fact these are the same thing, normativity ont/funct , then we have found a common, central object for cognitivists' and noncognitivists' claims. If cognitivists' talk about "normative" expressions or judgments has to be understood in an idiosyncratic, derivative sense, this may be interesting but not very important.
However, we began by thinking that the apparent agreement that certain expressions and judgments are "normative" was the most promising place to find common ground. If this rather turns out to be equivocal, we have to seriously ask whether we have any good reasons to think that cognitivists and noncognitivists are talking about the same thing. The evidence all seems to point the other way. First, as already noted, they locate "normativity" in entirely different places. Cognitivists find it in facts and properties, disagreeing among themselves whether it is also ever to be found in language or thought (generally), while noncognitivists deny it can ever be found in facts and properties, locating it only in language or thought (of a specific class). Second, there is some reason to doubt they are even talking about the same classes of expressions and judgments, since there is disagreement even over the exemplars of "normative" language. Noncognitivists often take imperatives like 'Keep off the grass!' to be central and particularly naked examples of normativity funct , but cognitivists characteristically deny that they are "normative" at all. 18 Finally, cognitivists' theories about the nature of normativity ont are generally radically different from noncognitivists' theories about the nature of normativity funct . (i) Many cognitivists are nonnaturalists, holding that "normativity" can't be reduced to or identified with anything natural, whereas noncognitivists hold that the "normativity" of expressions and judgments is naturalistically analyzable.
(ii) Cognitivists typically don't deny that "normative" language and thought characteristically has the natural properties that noncognitivists identify with normativity funct , such as expressing attitudes and putting motivational pressure on agents. They just deny that this is the property of normativity ont they're thinking about. (iii) Whereas cognitivists all think that some fact or property's being "normative" has essential entailments about what (e.g.) someone ought or has reason to do, noncognitivist identifications of some expression or judgment as "normative" involve no such commitments on the part of the theorist. Suppose a sadist judges that the suffering of innocents is good; noncognitivists may identify this as a normative funct judgment, but typically would deny that it follows from this that there is anything that the sadist herself, or anybody else, ought or has a reason to do. Noncognitivists do not necessarily or generally claim, for example, that if an agent makes the "normative" judgment that she herself ought to φ, then she ought to φ, or be motivated to φ, etc.-although something of the kind would be implied by the judgment's being normative ont rather than merely normative funct .
Given all these differences over the bearers, the exemplars, the nature and the implications of "normativity", if cognitivists and noncognitivists were talking about the same property, normativity ont/funct , then one party or the other would have to be extremely confused. We should prefer a more charitable interpretation, if one can be found.
Ostending Normativity
Many other kinds of effective definitions could be considered in the hope of leveraging the superficial convergence in classifying expressions and judgments as "normative" into a common subject-matter for cognitivists' and noncognitivists' claims about "normativity". Rather than surveying a variety of approaches that ultimately fail, I'll now sketch the approach I consider most promising. This takes the form of ostensive, natural (or non-natural) kind definitions, which look to one or more samples of expressions or judgments to pick out some underlying common characteristic, the identity and nature of which is open to dispute. Schematically:
(As of expressions/judgments); Having the common property of samples n 1 , n 2 , … Theorists who appeal to different samples would be operating with different versions of this kind of definition, but this is no barrier to univocity in talk of "normative" expressions or judgments so long as their definitions pick out the same underlying property or kind.
This approach has a number of things in its favor as an interpretation of metanormative theory. First, it can be motivated by the plausible observation that metanormative inquiry typically begins from reflection on an ordinary, ubiquitous practice of making a certain kind of claim or judgment. Second, many theorists endorse it either explicitly, 19 or implicitly by the way they introduce their quarry. Parfit, for example, appeals to a particular judgment (I ought to jump) in a particular scenario (Burning Hotelin which one's hotel is on fire and the only way out is through the second-story window) to fix on the kind of judgment that interests him. 20 Third, it plausibly locates a common object for cognitivists and noncognitivists, who can agree (mostly) 21 on what is and isn't a paradigm of "normative" language or thought, and that this class of expressions or judgments shares some philosophically important property that is (part of) what interests them. We could then interpret the parties as disagreeing substantively over whether normativity lang/judg-ost is to be identified as normativity rep or rather as normativity funct ; i.e. whether the common property that unifies the class of normative lang/judg-ost language and thought is the property of being about something that is normative ont , or the property of having some nondescriptive function F.
Obstacles to this approach remain, however. These seem best overcome by opting for a thought-or judgment-based definition (NORMATIVE judg-ost ) rather than a language-based one (NORMATIVE lang-ost ). 22 This is partly because the words commonly identified as "normative" are at least often ambiguous between normative and nonnormative uses or senses, making it difficult to ostend "normativity" by linguistic samples alone. 23 We can plausibly identify a derivative, theory-neutral sense of 'normative' as applying to language, as follows:
NORMATIVE lang-exp-judg : (As of language); Having the property of being conventionally used to express normative judg-ost judgments.
So, we might hope, cognitivists and noncognitivists can agree that they are interested in normative judg-ost judgments, and derivatively, normative lang-exp-judg language.
Some cognitivists may seem to resist this attempt at assimilation. Parfit, for example, insists that he's fundamentally interested in a certain property of facts and properties that he is directly acquainted with (perhaps picked out by an ostensive ontological definition, NORMATIVITY ont-ost (Parfit) ), and derivatively in judgments about that property (i.e. normative rep (Parfit) judgments), as in his Burning Hotel example. He expresses uncertainty about whether his opponents ever make these kinds of judgments, or whether ordinary natural language even contains normative rep (Parfit) words. 24 Taking Parfit at his word, if his suspicions are correct then he and his opponents would indeed be talking about different things. However, if his suspicions are incorrect then, even taking him at his word, this approach can secure common objects for theorists' talk of "normative" expressions and judgments-for example, if parties on both sides are employing effective definitions of the form NORMATIVE judg-ost using samples that are as a matter of fact of the same kind. Optimism seems justified, given that we are (1) all human agents with the same cognitive faculties, (2) who (at least in English-speaking metanormative theory) are members of the same linguistic community, (3) largely apply "normative" vocabulary in the same ways, to the same objects and actions in the same scenarios, 25 and (4) employ these words similarly in regulating our conduct and communicating with others.
The main problem facing this approach is that ostension of samples alone might not be enough to fix on a particular underlying kind or property. The same set of samples can, and presumably will, be exemplars of multiple different kinds. A flat-footed example is that most theorists provide samples of words which have in common that they are members of the kind, words of English. Of course, we can easily narrow in on a more plausible range of kinds by including examples of what is excluded; e.g. the common property shared by words like 'ought' and 'good', but not by words like 'tall' and 'blue' . But even here we might reasonably worry that the samples ostended underdetermine a particular reference for normativity judg-ost . Perhaps, for example, the samples feature both normativity funct and normativity rep (cognitivists do not generally deny that these words have the functions that noncognitivists describe, after all); do our definitions then pick out one, the other, both, or neither?
Is there any way of narrowing in on the relevant kind of judgment that doesn't exclude either cognitivists or noncognitivists? Common ground can arguably be found over the role of normative judgment in practical deliberation. 26 Approximately, normative judgments are the kinds of judgments that we aim at reaching to close our deliberations, and on which we directly base our decisions or actions. This is certainly something that at least some cognitivists and noncognitivists agree about. For example, David Enoch (2011a) is a nonnaturalist cognitivist who claims that normative judgments are "deliberatively indispensible"; i.e. one simply isn't deliberating if not employing normative concepts and reasoning toward normative judgments. The naturalist noncognitivist Allan Williams 1981 . Note also that this strategy looks problematic in application to (e.g.) epistemic or aesthetic normativity. Here we might either try to find some epistemic/aesthetic analog to deliberation, or deny that these are "normativity" in the same sense (perhaps, for example, they are merely "formally normative"; see section 3.2).
means by) "normative" judgments. 27 Since he never denies that all agents deliberate and make decisions, he would presumably allow that some of us may close our deliberations or base our decisions on something other than "normative" judgments. I expect he and others would insist that normative judgments are merely the kind of judgments that rational agents aim to base decisions on, or that agents ought to aim to base decisions on, and would charge my attempted characterization with the psychologistic fallacy. This is a reason not to try to turn our proposed platitude into an analytic definition, true in virtue of meaning. However, an ostensive-style definition can accommodate it. Parfit would surely agree that normative judgments are a kind of judgments that some agents aim to close their deliberation with and base their decisions on. We could identify these agents under some normative classification (e.g. rational) or simply ostensively (e.g. me). Indeed, in Parfit's paradigm of a normative judgment in Burning Hotel, the judgment is playing exactly this deliberative role (2011: 326-7). So long as theorists are using ostensive definitions, picking out that kind of judgment (whichever it is) that actually satisfies the characterization they have in mind, they can be talking about the same kind of judgment even if they have different characterizations in mind (i.e. they disagree about the class of agents for whom it plays that role).
I therefore suggest that in NORMATIVE judg-ost we have identified a kind of concept which could, at least in principle, provide a common object for cognitivists' and noncognitivists' claims about "normative judgments", despite the enormous differences between them. Similarly, in NORMATIVE lang-exp-judg we have a potentially unifying concept for their claims about "normative language". There is thus reason for optimism about the univocity of at least these parts of metanormative discourse. I hesitate to draw the stronger conclusion that this is the kind of concept all theorists actually employ, and thereby that claims about "normative judgments" are actually univocal-although if a principle of charity operates at the level of a whole field we might invoke it here.
What about the "normativity" of facts and properties, which cognitivists identify as the ultimate object of their investigations? The ostensive definitions I've proposed don't provide a common object here; cognitivists clearly don't mean to classify these facts and properties as normative judg-ost , and so we still need another sense of 'normative' to accommodate these claims along the lines of NORMATIVE ontperhaps of the following, derivative kind:
Having the property P that is common to all and only the kinds of facts and properties that normative judg-ost judgments (and normative lang-exp-judg expressions) are about.
Here our previous conclusions seem to stand. Noncognitivists are committed to denying that anything is normative ont-judg-rep , since they reject the presupposition that normative judg-ost judgments as such are about any special kind of property. From their point of view, cognitivists are engaged in a wild goose chase, led astray by their signature misinterpretation of the underlying nature of these judgments. Their positive claims about the nature of "normativity", therefore, are not claims about normativity ont-judg-rep , the primary object of cognitivist's metanormative claims. Regarding this, Parfit's claim that noncognitivism is "close to nihilism" (2011: 267) therefore seems right or even overly cautious.
Which side is right? This is a difficult question, as the past century of metaethics attests. The cognitivists' claim can seem compelling. In Parfit's Burning Hotel scenario it seems phenomenologically correct to say that one looks for and recognize a fact, of a distinctively normative ont kind, about what one ought or has most reason to do, and that this is what our normative judg-ost judgment is about. But the noncognitivists' positive claim can seem compelling too: that normative judg-ost judgments are distinguished as a kind by having a special nonrepresentational property or function. Another option, however, is a widely overlooked kind of hybrid position: that normative judg-ost judgments are distinguished as a kind by the combination of both (i) being about a special normative ont kind of property, and (ii) having a special nonrepresentational property or function. This is importantly different from the familiar kind of "hybrid theory", very much in fashion today, which attributes normative judg-ost judgments both cognitive content and noncognitive properties. These familiar, firstorder hybrid theories are generally not hybrid regarding the second-order question which is at issue here, concerning a judgment's status as normative. 28 Instead, they adopt a straightforwardly noncognitivist answer to this question, assigning normative judg-ost judgments ordinary, "nonnormative" contents, rejecting the cognitivist (in our sense) view that they are distinguished by being normative rep or about properties of a normative ont kind. We'll see below that the option of a second-order hybrid theory, about what distinguishes a judgment as being normative judg-ost , significantly complicates the possible interpretations of cognitivists' claims about normativity ont .
Univocity Among Cognitivists
I turn now to examine the prospects for univocity in talk about "normativity" among cognitivists. These are commonly divided into two broad camps: naturalists who claim that "normativity" is identical or reducible to ordinary "natural" properties, and nonnaturalists like Parfit who deny it. Here we can ignore the difficult issue of how to understand the relevant concept of naturalness, as the most salient difference for our purposes is that nonnaturalists generally deny that "normativity" can be analyzed or reduced in "nonnormative" terms at all. 29 The camp of naturalists can be further divided into subjectivists, who analyze "normativity" in broadly or partly psychological terms (e.g. involving counterfactual motivation or relations to desires or agency), and objectivists who analyze "normativity" in terms of some nonpsychological natural property. 30 Cognitivists have generally assumed that there is 28 Possible exceptions articulating potentially second-order hybridist views include the "de dicto cognitivism" of Tresan 2006 (about "moral" judgments) and the "relational expressivism" of Toppinen 2013 , Schroeder 2013 also Laskowski 2017 , Copp 2017 , and cf. Finlay 2004 , 2010 . As I understand Mike Ridge's distinction between "ecumenical" cognitivism and noncognitivism (2014: 6-7), this form of (perfect) something which they all call "normativity", the nature of which is at issue between them. But after many years of arguing against (particularly subjectivist) forms of naturalism, Parfit has come to the conclusion that theorists who appear to disagree with him about the nature of normativity, or of "reasons", must instead be using a different concept and talking about something else entirely. He identifies as many as five different senses (2011: 267-8) , and claims that naturalism, like noncognitivism, is "close to nihilism", the view that there are no normative ont facts and properties (2011: 368).
The previous section provides some reason to suspect this unduly pessimistic. We might reasonably suppose that whatever their differences, cognitivists should all agree that the object of their theories is normativity ont-judg-rep : the special property, whatever it might be, possessed by all and only the facts and properties of the kind that our normative judg-ost judgments are about. But among nonnaturalists it is commonly thought that the normativity ont that interests them is just too different (as David Enoch puts it) 31 from natural facts and properties to be naturalistically analyzable, and some go so far as to claim that this is so self-evident that nobody could seriously suppose otherwise. On this basis, Parfit concludes that charity requires interpreting naturalists' claims as addressed to a different object altogether. How else could the dramatic differences between the theories be explained?
Below I examine the prospects for univocity between different cognitivists' claims about the "normativity" of facts and properties. I start by exploring two straightforward polysemies in ontological senses of "normativity": (i) an abstract/substantive distinction, and (ii) a formal/robust distinction. Reflection on these will lead us to a second-order hybrid option with significant but ambiguous implications for univocity in metanormative theory. On one hand, against Parfit's pessimism it suggests an alternative, univocity-compatible explanation of why different philosophers are drawn to such radically different theories. But on the other hand, it also suggests a range of subtly but importantly different things that these theorists could be talking about under the label of "normativity", despite their shared interest in a single, cognitive kind of normative judg-ost judgment.
Abstract vs. Substantive
Before we can get to grips with the nature of "normativity" we need to observe an often overlooked distinction between normative properties and (the property of) normativity. So cognitivists' claims about "normativity" are about this third-level property, right? Not so fast. Theorists commonly proceed straight from an analysis of (e.g.) what it is to be a reason, or an analysis of ought-facts, to the claim to have analyzed "normativity", or from the claim that the reason-relation or ought-facts are unanalyzable, to the claim that "normativity" is unanalyzable. 33 Many claims about "normativity" are clearly about the second-level facts and properties, i.e. about the things that are (inherently) normative ont like ought-facts, the reason relation, and the property of goodness, rather than about what it is to be normative ont . (Occasionally, one comes across a particularly flat-flooted identification of "normativity" with the first-level or derivatively normative ont facts and properties, as in the claim that "normativity" is natural because things like pain and the fact it is raining are natural.)
This could be interpreted as a simple fallacy of conflation; failing to observe the difference between a property (normativity ont ), and that which has that property (the things that are normative ont ). 34 Perhaps more charitably, we might recognize it as a further form of regular polysemy in uses of 'normativity'. Nouns formed by nominalizing adjectives ('normative''normativity') are often ambiguous, used to refer either to the higher-order or abstract property P predicated by the adjective, or to any of a set of lower-order or substantive, P-making, properties (or tropes/property-instances). For example, we might identify the "nutritiousness" of a carrot substantively with its vitamin-A content and the "nutritiousness" of a potato substantively with its carbohydrate content, whereas the abstract property of nutritiousness, 32 This distinction is drawn in various terms; e.g. Parfit 2011: 329 . This is, in fact, one of the ways G.E. Moore (1903) characterizes the "naturalistic fallacy": confusing substantive and adjective, perhaps on the basis of failing to distinguish the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication. Ironically, many contemporary nonnaturalists (among others) may be committing the mistake Moore cautioned against! which the carrot and the potato share in virtue of their respective vitamin and carbohydrate content, is approximately the property of being disposed to promote a person's health when consumed.
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Use of 'normativity' (="normativeness") presents the same polysemous pattern. First-level normative ont facts and properties (e.g. the fact that it's raining, the property of being painful) have the abstract (thirdlevel) property of normativity ont because they have second-level normative ont properties (e.g. being a reason to open your umbrella, being bad). Accordingly, 'normativity' is apt to be used in a substantive sense to refer to the second-level normative ont properties in virtue of which the first-level facts and properties are normative ont . In the substantive sense, "normativity" would not strictly be a property, but rather something like a kind or set of properties, relations, etc., or a domain of reality: "the normative". 36 We can therefore distinguish a further dimension of ambiguity in the noun, between abstract and substantive senses:
The property of being normative ont ;
NORMATIVITY ont-sub :
The properties (etc.) that are inherently normative ont ("the normative").
Recognizing such a polysemy only gets charity so far, however. It still seems we have to recognize widespread equivocation or confusion in metanormative theory. Notice that it doesn't necessarily follow from a fact or property at the second level (like goodness, or being-a-reason-for) having a certain property (like being analyzable, unanalyzable, natural, or nonnatural) that the property at the third level (normativity ont-ab ) also has that property, or vice versa. For example, nonnatural second-level properties, if there are any, can have the (arguably) natural third-level property of being thought about by us.
Conceivably, therefore, normative ont-sub properties like being a reason could be nonnatural while the property of normativity ont-ab is entirely natural, or vice versa. It is open to nonnaturalists about the reason-relation or value to identify normativity ont-ab as the property of being the kind of property that agents look to in order to close their deliberations, for example. This looks like an entirely natural thirdlevel property, although it could conceivably be possessed only by nonnatural second-level properties. A rival suggestion is that to be "normative" is to reduce to facts about reasons, 37 which is clearly addressing normativity ont in the abstract sense. This would make normativity ont-ab a reductively analyzable property, but would presumably refer questions about its naturalness back down to the second-level issue concerning the naturalness of the reason-relation.
This possibility of "ticket-splitting" has not been widely recognized, 38 and even theorists who draw the distinction explicitly seem to assume without argument that the questions of naturalness and analyzability must have the same answer at both levels. Parfit himself may be a case in point. He Thomson (1996) identifies moral "goodness" with the various ways of being morally good, such as being generous, being just, etc. This could be interpreted as conflating a second-level property (goodness) with first-level (goodness-making) properties. See also Railton 1990 ('seaworthiness' analogy), Mackie 1977: 56. 36 Moltmann 2013 argues that nominalized adjectives (of the form 'F-ness') don't refer to abstract properties (of F) at all, but this seems to overlook their abstract uses. 37 E.g. Hampton 1998 : 115, Raz 1999 : 67, Schroeder 2007 . 38 One exception is Eklund (2017: 65) , who also takes Parfit to task on this point.
objects to theories that analyze normative properties like being-a-reason as a natural property N that they face a fatal "lost property" problem, of explaining what it is that we would learn about N if we were to learn that N is the normative property of being-a-reason. A naturalist about reasons could reply that we learn that N has the property of normativity ont-ab , or of being normative ont ; perhaps, for example, that N is a property that certain agents (or even Parfit himself) looks to in order to settle deliberation.
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Observing this distinction presents us with a fork in the road. Should the problem of univocity in cognitivists' talk about "normativity" be understood in the abstract sense, or the substantive sense-or both? The various familiar positions, like nonnaturalism, subjectivist and objectivist naturalism, seem primarily to be theories of the nature of inherently normative ont facts and properties, i.e. of normativity ont-sub . Privileging instead the abstract property of normativity ont-ab would make for strange bedfellows and an unfamiliar, topsy-turvy metanormative landscape where the self-described "nonnaturalist" David Enoch might be able to agree with self-described "naturalists" like David Copp (2012) and Laura and Francois Schroeter (ms) that "normativity" is reductively analyzable as the property of being the kind of thing that agents look toward to close deliberation, in opposition to the self-described "naturalist" Mark Schroeder and the self-described "nonnaturalists" Parfit and Tim Scanlon (1998) who might agree that it is the property of reducing to facts about reasons. 40 So the familiar battlelines drawn between cognitivists over the nature of "normativity" seem best interpreted, by and large, in terms of normativity ont-sub , or the nature of inherently normative ont facts and properties.
By comparison, the question of what normativity ont-ab is has drawn relatively little attention.
Despite revealing what looks like rampant equivocation over "normativity", observing this ambiguity may actually be a promising development for the propects of unity in metanormative theorizing. This is because even if the different theories of "normativity" in the substantive sense turn out to be about radically different facts and properties, they could still be unified by the common aim of describing those facts and properties, whichever they are, that have the further, third-level property of normativity ont-ab that theorists are largely assuming rather than analyzing. The radical differences between the camps could then be explained by divergence in opinion about which facts and properties those are. Of course, this hope hinges on different theorists assuming the same third-level property, which is possible even if they do or would endorse different official definitions of it, but we have yet to identify decisive evidence for or against this. I take up this issue below.
Formal vs. Robust Normativity
The way forward may seem clear. In section 2.3, I suggested that what unifies cognitivists and noncognitivists is a common interest in a particular kind of judgment we all make. What unifies all 39 See also Copp 2007 Copp , 2012 , who appears to infer immediately from normative ont properties being natural to normativity ont-ab being natural. On one page (2012: 26), he writes both that "the fundamental issue is whether the normativity of moral facts and properties can be understood naturalistically", and that "The arguments I consider…attack the thesis that normative properties are natural properties" (my emphases). The distinction is much sharper in his 2017, pp. 32-3. 40 I'm not claiming that these theorists all accept these analyses of normativity ont-ab , merely that they are broadly consistent with what they say in some places (see Copp 2017: 32-3 for a clearly different account).
cognitivists against noncognitivists, I provisionally suggested, is the view that these are representational judgments, about normative ont properties and facts. So we might suppose that univocity can be secured by defining normativity ont-ab as normativity ont-judg-rep : the property, whatever it might be, shared by all and only the facts and properties of the kind that normative judg-ost judgments are about, 41 and by defining normativity ont-sub as the facts and properties that have this property inherently. However, I will now argue that matters aren't so straightforward. The difficulty will emerge from reflection on a further, much-discussed ambiguity in talk about "normativity", between robust and formal senses.
Cognitivists encounter difficulties in identifying the object of their investigations, normativity ont (whether abstract or substantive) to others in uncontroversial terms, due to the lack of agreement over its nature. These difficulties are particularly acute for nonnaturalists, since they deny that "normativity" can be analyzed, defined, or explained in "nonnormative" terms. Attempts to pick it out therefore generally rely on either the mention (in language-based ostensions) or use (in judgment-based ostensions) of normative lang-exp-judg language: "normativity" is the special property or domain of what "ought to", "should", "must", or "may" be, or of "obligation", "right" and "wrong", "correct" and "incorrect", "value", "good" and "bad", or-the present favorite-of "reasons". 42 Allan Gibbard identifies the target by reference to "a circle of ought-like terms", for example, and Mark Schroeder defines it as what is reducible to "reasons".
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Inconveniently however, at least much of this normative lang-exp-judg vocabulary turns out to be apparently ambiguous. As John Broome puts it, I could not explain the term 'normative' except in terms of 'ought'. 'Normative' means 'to do with ought', but this ought has to be a normative one, of course. So this definition gets us nowhere if we cannot already identify the normative ought. I simply have to assume you know a normative ought when you meet one. (2013: 10) There are ordinary uses of 'ought', 'must', 'may', 'should', 'obligation', 'right', 'wrong', 'correct', 'incorrect', 'value', 'good' and 'bad' that apparently describe facts and properties that most nonnaturalists readily allow are naturalistic and reductively analyzable (e.g. Parfit 2011: 308), and subjectivists readily allow are nonpsychological. For example, "oughts" of etiquette, "right" answers to exam questions, "good" moves in chess, and (more controversially) legal "obligations". Philosophers therefore commonly deny that these statements are about the normative ont facts and properties that are the objects of their metanormative investigations.
One might think the quarry can be identified, extensionally if not helpfully, as what the normative uses of 'ought', 'right', 'good', 'value', etc. are about. The need for a general term to capture this "fugitive thought" eluding our grasp in ordinary normative lang-exp-judg language may be a primary motivation for theorists largely abandoning talk of "value", "obligation", etc. since the 1970s in favor of 'normativity' as a term of art. But if so the move has been an ironic failure, because today exactly the same distinction is observed for the term 'normative' itself. As Broome continues,
The terminology in this area is confusing because so many words have both normative and nonnormative senses. Even the word 'normative' has a nonnormative (in my sense) sense. (2013: 11) This distinction is marked with various terminology; here I'll adopt the relatively theory-neutral labels of formal versus robust normativity ont . 44 "Mere" formal normativity ont is said to be ubiquitous (found in law, etiquette, games, shopping lists, and more), naturalistic, nonsubjective, but also of little philosophical interest. Robust normativity ont is said to be the important kind of normativity ont of special interest to ethics, epistemology, and other branches of "normative" philosophy.
Some theorists think this ambiguity problem can be solved by identifying a special subset of normative lang-exp-judg vocabulary that is unambiguously robust, lacking any formal sense. 'Reason' has been the most popular candidate. Parfit, for example, distinguishes robust normativity as "reasonimplying" from formal normativity as "rule-implying". I think this attempt to disambiguate "normativity" fails to cut the phenomena at its joints. We can legitimately talk about merely "institutional" reasons, such as legal reasons, or reasons of chess, 45 and some domains of allegedly robust normativity, like morality, seem to imply robustly normative rules like the Categorical Imperative or the Principle of Utility. This claim might be rejected, or a theorist might appeal to some other normative lang-exp-judg word instead. 46 While the jury is still out on this strategy, I'll sketch an alternative way of looking at the relationship between formal and robust normativity, one which treats the parallel vocabularies as an important datum to be explained rather than a problem to be circumnavigated or explained away. 47 My goal is not to establish that this view is correct (although I believe it is), but to show how it greatly complicates the task of defining normativity ont .
Are formal and robust normativity ont both forms of "normativity" in the same sense? Or do the qualifiers here function to disambiguate different senses of a word, as in "river banks and financial banks"? The parallel vocabularies are a strong reason to think the former. A certain chess move might be a good move because it is likely to provoke one's opponent into a rash response, which is a reason to make it, but doesn't obviously imply any rule. Similarly, some philosophers acknowledge the existence of moral reasons while denying they are necessarily robustly normative; e.g. Finlay 2006 , Copp 2007 For example, 'rational', 'matters', or 'important'. For discussion, see Finlay 2006 Finlay , 2014 cf. Korsgaard 1996: 42-4. 47 A speculative diagnosis: (1) The original sense of 'normative'/'normativity' was the formal one, as suggested by etymology (from 'norm'). (2) Moral philosophers, interested in a particular (robust) subset of formally normative judgments, began using the adjective 'normative' to distinguish these from ordinary, "descriptive" judgments, then (3) in the late 1970s started using the noun 'normativity' derivatively in a new, robust (abstract) sense, intending to refer to a property shared by the objects of those robust judgments that previously lacked a clear label. 48 Note also that drawing the distinction doesn't seem awkward without repeating the noun; compare 'formal and robust normativity' (natural) with 'river and financial banks' (odd).
function subsectively? (An adjective A is subsective just in case being an A N entails being an N.) For example, 'formal' might function anti-subsectively like 'fake' (or non-subsectively like 'alleged'), in which case even if there is one common meaning of 'normativity' at issue, formal normativity isn't really (or necessarily) normativity at all. We could then presume that 'robust' is exhaustively subsective, and equivalent to 'true' or 'genuine' (e.g. Broome 2013); all normativity would then be robust normativity. Or 'formal' might function subsectively, so that formal and robust normativity are each subclasses of normativity ont in a general and common sense.
Many theorists are attracted to the former, anti-or non-subsective views. Among legal philosophers, for example, it is a popular idea that legal "normativity" (abstract) consists in law as such necessarily purporting to be genuinely (or robustly) normative. 49 However, this view faces difficulties. It is controversial even in the philosophy of law, and seems much less plausible for other instances of "formal normativity", such as games like chess and football, grocery lists, or exam rubrics. (Is calling an exam answer "wrong" really to pretend or allege that it is "robustly" prohibited?) Additionally, there are popular and plausible analyses of what it is to be formally normative which make it out to be something real rather than fake or putative. It's commonly and plausibly said that what it is for something to be "formally normative" is just for it to provide a standard, rule, or norm-in the etymologically original senses of yardstick, ruler, or builder's square-against which other things can be compared. 50 So for example, a code of laws describes a set of (ideal) behaviors, against which actual behavior can be compared, and a shopping list describes a set of possible purchases, against which actual purchases can be compared. Formal normativity ont-ab would then be roughly norm-relativity.
Along such lines, in my own work I have claimed to provide a reductively naturalistic, objectivist analysis of "normativity" (in a substantive sense) as consisting in end-relational properties of increasing/ decreasing the probability of some outcome or "end", and rule-relational properties of conforming/ nonconforming with some proposition or "rule". 51 I subsume these with what Kant called "hypothetical imperatives of skill", or claims about what has to happen in order that some outcome obtains. This invites the objection that my account is about the wrong kind or sense of normativity ont . 52 Other selfdescribed cognitivists, like nonnaturalists and subjectivists, are interested in robust normativity ont-sub , or what our normative judg-ost judgments are (apparently) about. So Parfit's pessimistic conclusion might seem partially vindicated: at least one of his supposed cognitivist opponents isn't talking about "normativity" in the same sense at all.
However, this conclusion may be too hasty. I have advanced my claims about "normativity" in full awareness of the formal/robust distinction, and that my fellow metanormative theorists are typically 49 E.g. Raz 1979 ; for extension to formal normativity generally, see Wodak ms. Within the philosophy of law it is disputed whether legal normativity as such is formal or robust; for some recent discussion see interested only in the latter. My reductivist, objectivist claims about "normativity" are based on the belief that "robustly normative" judgments and expressions are about exactly the same kind of facts and properties as "formally normative" judgments and expressions. So these claims are concerned with (substantive) normativity ont-judg-rep , the facts and properties that normative judg-ost judgments are about, which we were supposing to be the common object of cognitivist theories.
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This view might seem absurd: surely there is a clear difference between formal and robust normativity ont ! I agree, at least, that there is a clear difference between mere judgments about formal normativity ont-sub , such as many ordinary judgments about the requirements of law, games, and etiquette, and (robustly) normative judg-ost judgments, such as (perhaps) those about the requirements of morality or rationality. 54 But it doesn't follow that those judgments are about different kinds of facts and properties. Here we may recall the noncognitivists' views about what distinguishes a judgment as normative judg-ost , and the availability of a (second-order) hybrid theory of this. Perhaps what distinguishes a judgment as robustly normative is not merely what it is about, but also some other, nonrepresentational property it has.
For concreteness, I'll just assume my own preferred view here: that robustly normative judg-ost judgments are distinguished from nonrobust judgments about normative ont facts and properties by being made from a relevantly motivated perspective. 55 A judgment with end-relational content (concerning the probability of some outcome) is "robust" in case the judge contemporaneously desires the end in question, and a judgment with rule-relational content (concerning what conforms with some general proposition), such as a legal judgment, is "robust" in case she contemporaneously accepts the rule in question as a guide to conduct. In Parfit's Burning Hotel scenario, for example, there is apparently no deliberation or question over whether to live or die; the goal of living is simply assumed. Within this deliberative context, the judgment "[In order to live], I ought to jump!" qualifies as robustly normative judg-ost . On this view, an amoralist's "moral judgments" would be "merely formal" judgmentsdespite possibly having the same content as the moral judgments of ordinary people 56 -while the committed mafioso's judgments of familial obligation are robustly normative judg-ost judgments. I'll call this kind of hybrid view of normative judg-ost judgments a perspectivist account, tipping my hat to Nietzsche who (to my knowledge, and by my reading) was the first philosopher to propose it.
I reiterate that my purpose in introducing perspectivism here is not to establish it as correct (although I believe it is), but rather to explore what recognizing this overlooked part of theoretical space implies about the univocity of metanormative theory. It is worth noting, however, that the option has far more explanatory power on the hypothesis that it is correct. I also believe it escapes at least most of the objections that have been directed against other views.
53 See Woods 2017 for a detailed account of formal normativity along similar lines. 54 Similarly, this doesn't identify robust normativity ont-ab (being robustly normative) with formal normativity ont-ab (being formally normative). 55 For similar views, see references in note 28. This corresponds to H.L.A. Hart's distinction in the philosophy of law between "internal" and "external" legal judgments or statements (as interpreted in Finlay & Plunkett 2018; cf. Raz 1993 , Smith 1994 . 56 Cf. Tresan 2006 , Finlay 2004 
A Perspectivist Diagnosis of Metanormative Disagreement
From the perspectivist's point of view, metanormative theorists are unified by interest in a kind of judgments that exist, and can be properly understood, only within the two-dimensional space generated by the twin axes of subjective psychology or motivation, and objective world. This gives perspectivism the resources to explain why different theorists could have come to such starkly opposed views of a common subject matter: each of the positions correctly perceives part of the phenomenon but fails to see the whole, and so goes wrong in trying to analyze something essentially two-dimensional in just a single dimension, as depicted in the table below. Furthermore, each camp is sensitive to the errors committed by their opponents, which, given ignorance of the perspectivist alternative, serves to further strengthen their conviction that their own views must be correct. From this vantage-point, noncognitivism is explained as the result of recognizing the noncognitive dimension of robust normative judg-ost judgment (e.g. that they are made from a motivated perspective), but-perhaps blinded by this insight-missing the cognitive dimension, of what those judgments are about. As Parfit complains against Gibbard, normative judgment isn't a matter of arbitrary choice or preference, but (in part) of discovering antecedently existing facts (2011: 386f, 408) .
Objectivist naturalism, whether of neo-Aristotelian (e.g. Foot 2001 , Thomson 2008 or non-Aristotelian (e.g. Copp 2007 , Finlay 2014 forms, is explained as a result of recognizing both the cognitive dimension and (broadly) the essentially nonpsychological nature of its content (what robustly normative judg-ost judgments are about), but perhaps failing to sufficiently heed the (noncognitive) difference between robustly normative judg-ost judgments and mere judgments of formally normative ont facts and properties.
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Hence the charge commonly leveled against such views, that they have left out the "normativity" altogether. As Parfit approvingly quotes Darwall, "For the philosophical naturalist, concerned to place normativity within the natural order, there is nothing plausible for normative force to be other than motivational force" (2011: 363).
Subjectivist naturalism, whether Humean or Kantian, can be explained as a result of sensitivity to the (noncognitive) dimension that differentiates robustly normative judg-ost judgments from mere judgments of formal normativity ont , as well as recognition of the cognitive dimension, but failing to recognize that these are two separate dimensions, and therefore misinterpreting the noncognitive dimension in terms of cognitive content, incorrectly analyzed in psychological terms (psychologistic fallacy Nonnaturalism, finally, can be explained as also being sensitive to both dimensions though failing to distinguish them, but also recognizing that the content is nonpsychological, and as a result misinterpreting the specially robust character of these judgments in terms of their being about something of a special robust character (projective fallacy). 60 Also recognizing that no other kind of ordinary, natural property is such that being about it would be sufficient to give normative judg-ost judgments their special robust character, nonnaturalists mistakenly but understandably conclude that these judgments must be about special, nonnatural properties, the implausible mysteriousness of which encourages error theorists to maintain that all positive normative judg-ost judgments are untrue.
Perspectivism therefore provides an alternative explanation of how metanormative theorists could come to such starkly different views, one that has promise to rescue us from Parfit's pessimism about the unity of metanormative debate. However, once we return to address explicitly what cognitivists might mean by (abstract or substantive) "normativity", the case for ambiguity is bolstered. For this twodimensional, perspectivist view on normative judg-ost judgment brings to light a large number of alternative things that these different theorists might reasonably mean by 'normativity'. Rather than dismissing the various camps as mistaken about the nature of "normativity", we might rather identify different concepts they could be using on the basis of their sensitivity to different parts of the complex phenomenon of normative judg-ost judgment as understood by the perspectivist. 
The Many Possible Faces of Normativity
Start with the concept we introduced above (separated into substantive and abstract senses);
NORMATIVITY ont-judg-rep-sub : The facts and properties of the kind that normative judg-ost judgments are about.
59 2011: 324f, 431f. See also Dancy 2005 , Enoch 2011a Cf. Copp 2017: 48. Perspectivism also offers a potential explanation of many nonnaturalists' barely comprehensible quietist claims that "normativity" exists/ is a property, but not in any "ontological" sense (Parfit 2011 , Scanlon 2014 , as a confused attempt to reconcile the facts that (i) robustly normative judg-ost judgments are about a particular kind of facts and properties, but (ii) there is no property of robust normativity ont . 61 For similar speculation, see McPherson & Plunkett ms.
NORMATIVITY ont-judg-rep-ab : The property shared by all and only the facts and properties of the kind that normative judg-ost judgments are about.
According to perspectivism, objectivist naturalism (of the kind advocated in my own work) provides the correct account of normativity ont-judg-rep-sub , which turns out to be exactly the same kind of facts and properties that merely "formally normative" judgments are about. So if nonnaturalists (like Parfit) and subjectivists are employing the same effective definition in their talk about "normativity", as I hypothesized above, then their metanormative claims are false. They err about the nature of normativity ont-judg-rep because they wrongly attribute the special character of their (robust) normative judgost judgments to it. Of course, they would deny that they are talking about "mere formal normativity". But this would be mistaken, just like somebody who wonders "what is this stuff?" upon encountering ice for the first time denying they were talking about "mere" water or H 2 O. 62 According to nonnaturalists and subjectivists, on the other hand, perspectivism errs about normativity ont-judg-rep because it wrongly attributes this difference to an alleged noncognitive or nonrepresentational property of normative judg-ost judgments.
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However, there is some evidence that the "robustness" of the property itself may be nonnegotiable for at least some cognitivists' concept of "normativity". For example, some nonnaturalists declare that either "normativity" is irreducible, or else it doesn't exist at all (e.g. Parfit 2011: 267). These claims might simply reflect what (from the perspectivist's point of view) is the nonnaturalists' mistake, but they could instead point towards other, more discriminating effective definitions. For example, sometimes nonnaturalists-together with error theorists about "normativity"
64
-seem to employ concepts along the following lines:
NORMATIVITY ont-judg-rep-robust-sub : The facts and properties of the kind that normative judg-ost judgments are about, in virtue of which they are (robustly) normative judg-ost .
NORMATIVITY ont-judg-rep-robust-ab : The property shared by all and only the facts and properties of the kind that normative judg-ost judgments are about, in virtue of which they are (robustly) normative judg-ost .
Or alternatively, a directly ostensive ontological definition:
NORMATIVITY ont-ost-robust : That property (ostending a "robust" property being cognized, perceived, or imagined). 62 For discussion of such opacity in normative thought and language, see Copp 2012 , Laskowski 2017 The most pressing worry might be that perspectivism, like noncognitivism, cannot adequately account for practices of wondering or deliberating about final ends or intrinsic value (e.g. In either case, the perspectivist will conclude that the projective fallacy infects the very concepts that nonnaturalists are employing, and that "normativity" in the nonnaturalists' substantive sense neither exists, nor (contra the error theorists) is what our ordinary normative judg-ost judgments are about.
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Now consider the subjectivists. They could conceivably be employing any of the effective definitions already surveyed in this section. In this case, perspectivism agrees with nonnaturalists like Parfit that subjectivist theories are in error, on the grounds that whatever normative judg-ost judgments are about (and whether or not it also explains their robustness), it isn't generally something psychological. Parfit doubts that anybody with his concept of (robust) normativity ont could reasonably believe it to be psychological, and so charity leads him to pessimism about a common object of inquiry between himself and subjectivists like Williams, Darwall, Korsgaard, and Schroeder. 66 Perspectivism casts helpful light here too. For it implies that whenever somebody makes a first-personal normative judg-ost judgment (e.g. about what she herself has a reason to do, or ought to do)
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, the propositional content of that judgment is true if and only if the object of judgment has a corresponding subjective property: roughly, a property of being instrumentally related to the satisfaction of a desire of the agent. Furthermore, according to perspectivism this subjective property may be the only property that is tracked by all first-personal normative judg-ost judgments as a kind, since different judgments are about different properties (as relevant to different motivated perspectives). It would therefore be understandable that a theorist might identify substantive normativity ont-judg-rep (what normative judg-ost judgments are about) or substantive normativity ont-judg-rep-robust (the facts and properties they are about in virtue of which they are robust) with this subjective property-even though this would be an error because, as nonnaturalists insist, normative judg-ost judgments are nonetheless not about such subjective properties.
While this provides a possible explanation of how theories as different as nonnaturalism (e.g. Parfit) and subjectivism (e.g. Williams) could be aimed at exactly the same object-and even by means of the same concepts-it also reveals how subjectivists' claims about "normativity" could be about a subtly but importantly different property or domain. Perhaps subjectivists are not using any of the above concepts at all, but rather a concept like NORMATIVITY ont-judg-relation : The relation that obtains between an agent and an action iff a firstpersonal, robustly normative judg-ost judgment about that agent and that action would be true.
personal judgments, in which agent-relativity and judge-relativity can come apart. Which kind of internality determines a judgment as being of the relevantly "robust" or normative judg-ost type?
By attributing the robustness of normative judg-ost judgments to their tracking or being about a partly psychological relationship between the agent and the action, subjectivists commit themselves to denying that any judge-internal judgment about normative ont facts and properties is a normative judg-ost judgment if it isn't also agent-internal. This gets subjectivists into trouble, with their opponents (nonnaturalists, noncognitivists, and others) objecting that second-and third-personal moral judgments are "robustly normative" yet also categorical, their truth-value being independent of any instrumental relationship to the agent's desires or agency. Perspectivism understands these objections as a result of privileging instead the judge-internal relation, and classifying a judgment as "robustly normative" only if it is internally related to the judge's own desires or agency (even if nonnaturalists misinterpret it due to the projective fallacy). Here perspectivism agrees with the noncognitivists: this relation lies wholly on the dimension of motivated perspective, rather than that of cognitive content. 72 Perhaps, then, subjectivists really are employing a different concept of "robust normativity"? If so, then the perspectivist will think that they should stand their ground and insist that morality indeed isn't necesssarily "normative" (e.g. that Hitler may not have had any genuinely "normative" reason not to engage in genocide) 73 , explaining away the indignant reactions such claims provoke as results of misunderstanding their (nonendorsing) sense of "normative". We can grant that there were exceptionally good reasons for Hitler not to engage in genocide, even if these weren't normativerelative-to-Hitler. However, subjectivists sometimes respond to this kind of objection by instead trying to accommodate the "normativity" of moral judgments by denying that they really are agent-externala move which typically strikes their opponents as desperate and implausible. This perceived need to accommodate the "normativity" of morality may be evidence that they are at least in part concerned to capture a kind of robustness which is in fact agent-external. 74 Since there are no facts and properties that all and only these judge-internal judgments are about (different judges being related in this way to different sets of formally normative ont facts and properties), and no special "normative" property shared by all the facts and properties in this (empty) set, this implies that no property of "robust normativity" along these lines, such as normativity ont-judg-rep-robust-ab , is ever instantiated. So we might conclude that the only robust kind of "normativity" to be found in the world is the noncognitivist's notion of normativity funct : the nonrepresentational, purely psychological property (or properties) of normative judg-ost judgments and normative lang-exp-judg language. However, there is at least one further possibility. We might still make sense of talk about "robustly normative facts and properties" by construing 'normative' as itself a (robustly) normative lang-exp-judg term. 75 This would be to adopt a quasi-realist concept of normativity ont , which could be defined, in the expressivist's "sidewayson" style, roughly as follows:
To apply this concept to some facts or properties involves having or expressing a favorable attitude towards them.
So for example, judging a fact F to be a normative quasi-ont reason to do A might be to approve of weighing F in favor of doing A.
This quasi-realist concept of "normativity" is presumably different from the concept that the subjectivist employs in claiming that "normativity" is always relative to or dependent on the relevant agent's desires. That is, unless the subjectivist happens (unusually and perversely) to approve of agents always acting in ways that instrumentally serve the agent's own desires, even if, for example, the desires in question are genocidal. 76 However, as Gibbard points out (2003: 184f) , the concept of normativity quasi-ont does a reasonable job of modeling the claims of nonnaturalists, who unlike subjectivists generally describe a fact, property, or consideration as "normative" only if they approve of an agent's being guided by it. So it could be argued that the metanormative claims of nonnaturalists like Parfit actually employ the concept of normativity quasi-ont , attributing their disavowals of noncognitivism either to a lack of self-understanding, 77 or to their metanormative claims being aimed at primarily practical rather than theoretical effect (i.e. "bullshitting"). In addition to being highly uncharitable, however, this interpretation is at odds with nonnaturalists' claims that "normativity" isn't a natural property, rather predicting identifications of "normativity" with whatever natural properties the theorist favors as a basis for decision. More plausibly, therefore, nonnaturalists employ genuinely cognitivist concepts of the "normativity" of facts and properties, of one or another of the kinds surveyed above.
Having exposed these potential ambiguities in talk about "normativity", we are now able also to identify potentially insidious cases of equivocation within familiar and influential lines of philosophical reasoning. It is commonplace today for theorists to recognize the distinction between mere "formal normativity" (which is neither judge-nor agent-internal; symbolically: ⃝), and "robust normativity". But what has usually not been noticed is that (if the proposals of this paper are correct) there are three distinct kinds of robustness: that involving judge-internality only (symbolically: Ф) , that involving agentinternality only (), and that involving both judge-and agent-internality (). Failure to recognize this may lead us into the following kinds of inferences:
Anti-Instrumentalist Inference: Moral oughts are robustly normative (Ф). Moral oughts do not depend on agents' attitudes. Therefore, it is not the case that robust normativity () depends on agents' attitudes.
Moral Instrumentalist Inference: Robust normativity () depends on agents' attitudes. Moral oughts are robustly normative (Ф). Therefore, moral oughts depend on agents' attitudes. 76 Although the implication that they do arguably lies behind the perceived outrageousness of subjectivist claims about (e.g.) what normative reasons monsters like Hitler might have. 77 Parfit concedes that he "cannot exclude the possibility" (2011: 272).
Moral Nihilist Inference: Robust normativity () depends on agents' attitudes. Moral oughts do not depend on agents' attitudes. Therefore, moral oughts are not robustly normative (Ф).
Noncognitivist Antirealist Inference: Judgments are robustly normative (Ф) in virtue of the judge's attitudes, not in virtue of being about a particular class of facts or properties. Therefore, there are no robustly normative () facts or properties.
Moral Rationalist Inference: Moral oughts are robustly normative (Ф). If an agent believes they ought to do A, and that 'ought' is robustly normative (/), then they are irrational if they are not motivated to do A. Therefore, if an agent believes they morally ought to do A, then they are irrational if they are not motivated to do A.
Anti-Egoist Inference:
Harm and pain are bad in a robustly normative way (). All else being equal we robustly ought (/Ф) to prevent whatever is bad in a robustly normative way (/Ф). Therefore, all else being equal we robustly ought (/Ф) to prevent harm and pain.
Isn't it a violation of the principle of charity to think that philosophers ever equivocate in these ways? Our reason to suspect equivocation is that while each of these premises is quite plausible (perhaps even compelling) under the suggested, equivocal disambiguations, each argument contains a premise or conclusion that is far less plausible (and perhaps even very implausible) under the disambiguation required for validity.
Conclusion
What do philosophers mean by 'normative' and 'normativity', and can the univocity of metanormative theory be saved? I first argued that univocity between cognitivists' and noncognitivists' talk about "normative" thought and language could plausibly be secured by an ostensive, judgment-focused concept. Plausibly, all metanormative theorists are united by interest in a common kind of judgment we all make. I then asked whether univocity in claims about the "normativity" of facts and properties between different kinds of cognitivists could be secured by a derivative concept, concerning what those normative judgments were about. My findings here were more ambiguous. First, I showed how a perspectivist, hybrid theory of normative judgments offers an explanation of how philosophers could come to such radically different views on this common subject-matter, potentially saving us from Parfit's pessimism about metanormative theory. But second, I showed how from this point of view we could alternatively distinguish a range of interrelated though different things that these theorists could plausibly mean by 'normativity'-which would save the truth of many of their superficially conflicting claims, but at the expense of implying that many metanormative debates do indeed involve us talking past each other. One way of looking at this is that metanormative theory is centrally concerned with a complex network of interrelated properties and relations, and the words 'normative' and 'normativity' are commonly used, polysemously, to pick out different parts of this network by different theorists and at different times-as I have concluded that I myself have done. My hope is that this investigation helps advance metanormative debate by aiding the disambiguation of different claims about "normativity" and thereby the avoidance of equivocations and mere verbal disputes. Eklund 2017 and Copp 2017 (although they don't take the threat of polysemy seriously). I owe special thanks to Derek Parfit for awakening me from this particular dogmatic slumber, and deeply regret the loss of the opportunity to hear his reactions.
Glossary of Definitions:
NORMATIVE ont : (As of facts and properties); Having a property P of some special kind.
NORMATIVE funct : (As of expressions or judgments); Having the nonrepresentational function(s) F.
NORMATIVE lang/judg-ost : (As of expressions/judgments); Having the common property of samples n 1 , n 2 , … NORMATIVE lang-exp-judg : (As of language); Having the property of being conventionally used to express normative judg-ost judgments.
NORMATIVE ont-judg-rep :
Having the property P that is common to all and only the facts and properties of the kind that normative judg-ost judgments (and normative lang-exp-judg expressions) are about.
NORMATIVITY ont-ab :
The property of being normative ont .
NORMATIVITY ont-ost-robust : That property (ostending a "robust" property being cognized, perceived, or imagined).
NORMATIVITY ont-judg-relation : The relation that obtains between an agent and an action iff a first-personal, robustly normative judg-ost judgment about that agent and that action would be true.
NORMATIVITY-RELATIVE-TO-S: The property of standing in the relation of normativity ont-judg-reason to s.
NORMATIVITY quasi-ont : To apply this concept to some facts or properties is to have or express a favorable attitude towards them.
